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AHMET E R T U G R U L and ERINC YELDAN
Turkey initiated an extensive disinflation program in December 1999,
which was backed and supervised by the Intemational Monetary Fund
(IMF). The aim of this program was to decrease the inflation rate to a
single digit by the end of 2002. It relied exclusively on a nominally pegged
(anchored) exchange rate system for disinflation, which has been a major
concem for Turkish policymakers for over three decades. In November
2000, however, one year after introducing the program, the country
experienced a very severe financial crisis. More than $6 billion of short-
term capital tied the country, creating a severe liquidity shortage and
skyrocketing interest rates.
In early December 2000, the government requested access to the
Supplemental Reserve Facility of the IMF. The request was granted, with
$7.5 billion of additional support provided on December 22, and the
revision ofthe technical targets ofthe monetary program. Only then could
continued implementation of the program be secured, as the markets
seemed to have calmed down. However, on February 19, 2001, shortly
after this arrangement with the IMF, the public disclosure of a political
dispute between the prime minister and the president badly wounded the
uneasy markets. The Central Bank was forced to sell a large portion of its
foreign reserves in an attempt to support the Turkish lira (TL) as the short-
term interest rates rocketed to over 5.000 percent. In the period that
followed, the government could not endure the pressures of the markets
any further, and declared the sun-ender ofthe pegged exchange rate system
on February 22, thereby letting the exchange rates free float.
Following the demise of the exchange rate-based disinflation program,
the newly appointed Finance Minister, Kemal Dervi§ (former vice
president of the World Bank) submitted a new letter of intent to the IMF.
On May 15, Dervi§ announced the invigoration of a new stabilization effort
under the guidance of a program entitled "'Turkey's Transition Program:
Strengthening the Turkish Economy." As mentioned in its introduction, the
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new program would be the continuation of the previous disinflation
program and would be backed by a series of "structural reforms" aimed at
strengthening the banking system and at transforming the "old ways of
economic policy making."'
However, the September 11 terrorist attack undermined the
implementation of this new program, affecting investors' perceptions
adversely. The Turkish govemment requested, in turn, a new three-year,
stand-by arrangement for offsetting the detrimental effects of the extemal
shock. The IMF accepted the new letter of intent dated January 18, 2002,
by providing a considerable amount of fmancial support.
The last two stand-by arrangements should clearly be regarded as the
continuation of the disinflation program launched at the end of 1999, even
though they were implemented after its failure. The main framework of the
program itself, as well as the crisis episode, has been a source of debate
since its very beginning.' In particular, it was alleged by the former deputy
managing director of the Fund, Stanley Fischer, that the difficulties in
Turkey relate more to the banking sector and to the deterioration of
macroeconomic fundamentals rather than any errors in program design.^ In
particular, according to Fischer, "The recent difficulties in Turkey relate
more to banking sector problems, and the failure to undertake corrective
fiscal measures when the current account widened."''
This contribution will attempt to examine this assertion given the
available macroeconomic evidence for Turkey. In particular, we highlight
the structural weakness of the exchange rate-hacked disinflation program
as manifested in its liquidity creation mechanism in a small and fragile
financial system such as Turkey. An analytical inquiry into the structural
causes of the Turkish crisis is clearly not limited to a theoretical curiosum;
such an inquiry has clear implications for stabilization policy and for the
culpability of the IMF-style austerity programs. Given the painstaking
fmancial erises of the 1990s in the developing world, such stocktaking on
the theoretical underpinnings of the orthodox stabilization plans is both
timely and urgent. The essay is constructed as follows: the next section
points to the underlying liquidity generation mechanism of the 2000
Turkish disinflation program; the following section documents the
fragility indicators of Turkish banking, and argues that the disinflation
program led to increased vulnerability in the banking system throughout
2000/1; we then briefly overview the fiscal fragility indicators of the
public sector and study the behavior of the interest rates under the
program; finally, we provide a summary and some concluding comments.
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THE LIQUIDITY GENERATION MECHANISM
UNDER THE DISINFLATION PROGRAM
The 2000 Turkish disinflation program adopted the monetary approach to
balance of payments as its theoretical foundation for the determination of
the liquidity generation mechanism and the resolution of the balance of
payments equilibrium. This approach, which provides the underlying
frame of reference for almost all IMF-style austerity programs, expects the
real exchange rate to be in long-run equilibrium at its purchasing power
parity level, and maintains that the domestic supply of money be
"endogenized" in a regime of open capital account.
Accordingly, the program limited the monetary expansion to changes
in the net foreign asset (NFA) position ofthe Central Bank, and fixed the
Bank's stock of net domestic assets (NDA) at its December 1999 level. It
was further announced that the Central Bank would be allowed to change
its net domestic asset position within a band of ± five percent of the
monetary base, to be revised at three-month intervals. The implication of
the rule necessitated the following identity:
Monetary Base = Net Foreign Assets + Net Domestic Assets
Consequently, as a result ofthe restrictions set on the upper ceilings ofthe
net domestic assets, the program limited the monetary expansion to
increases in the stock of net foreign assets.*
According to this rule, the liquidity generation mechanism available to
the Central Bank practically entailed a monetary regime of a semi-
currency board reminiscent of its Argentine counterpart. Within this
mechanism, the monetary policy is restricted to the direction ofthe foreign
exchange flows, and, as such, the most important element—to be able to
sustain the liquidity needs of the economy—would depend upon the
proper continuation ofthe foreign credit flow into the system.
The expansion ofthe monetary base was ultimately linked to the foreign
exchange infiows, indicating that the Central Bank was committed to the
strict rule of no-sterilization throughout the program. Therefore, it was
expected that the available liquidity in the domestic economy would be
managed by the interest signals inherent in smoothly operating financial
markets; rising domestic interest rates would invite foreign infiows,
allowing for monetary expansion. Excess liquidity would, in tum, be
signaled through lower rates of interest, allowing foreign capital outfiows to
balance the equilibrium level of liquidity in the domestic financial markets.
Figure 1 portrays the evolution of the liquidity mechanism under the
first ten months ofthe program's implementation. The figure discloses the
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paths of the monetary base, open market operations (OMOs), the net
foreign assets (NFA). and the net domestic assets (NDA) of the Central
Bank, as measured by the end-of-week observations, January 7 to
December 1, 2000. As can be seen, the Central Bank played the role of a
currency board quite successfully until November—the first sign of the
culminating crisis. Until then, the monetary base had expanded by only 7.6
percent, while the total assets of the Central Bank increased by a total
of 15 percent, mostly because of the rise in foreign inflows during
the summer months. All along, the Central Bank conducted its open
market operations with the intent to steer the NDA within the limits of
the program.
The basic message that emerges from the data in Figure 1 is clear:
Turkish monetary authorities have successfully implemented the monetary
program within the given targets, conditioning the Central Bank operations
to net foreign inflows. In this sense, the outbreak of the November crisis—
and the ultimate collapse of the program in February 2001—cannot be
attributed to any divergence from the monetary targets.
However, with the eruption of the first crisis in November 2000, and
then again in February 2001, it was clear that the basic foundations of the
liquidity creation mechanism were at fault. In fact, given the shallowness
and fragility of the Turkish financial system, the mechanism was always
incapable of bringing about such smooth adjustments towards equilibrium
as those envisaged by the program designers. In Table 1 we lay out the
basic characteristics of the financial system.
FIGURE I
MONETARY BASK, NET DOMESTIC ASSETS, NET FOREIGN ASSETS
AND NET OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
(JANUARY 7. 2000-DECEMBER 1, 2000, END-OE-WEEK OBSERVATIONS)
- Monetary base ^ - Net foreign assets ' Nei domesiio assets
Note:
Structural Weaknesses of the post-1999 Disinflation Program SI
TABLE 1
































































































* Rate of Doltarization -Ratio of foreign exchange deposits to total deposits of
residents.
Sources. Central Bank Balance of Payments Statistics; State Planning Organization. Main
Economic Indicators, at <http://ekutup,dpt,gov.tr/teg/2003/02/mei,html>.
As indicators tabulated in Table 1 reveal, the strategy of "public sector
deficit financing based on short-term foreign borrowing" led the banking
system to be more vulnerable to foreign exchange and interest risks.
Increasingly unhedged risk-taking behavior, coupled with a remarkable
build-up ofthe short positions in foreign currency in the banking sector,
raised serious doubts about the sustainability of the short-term capital
inflow-based public debt management policies.
As manifested in Table 1, the total assets ofthe banking sector to the
ratio of gross national product (GNP) stood at around 80 percent. On the
other hand, the sheer volume of short term foreign capital flows
intermediated through the banking sector is clearly indicative of their gross
volatility and erratic movements. The volume of inflows of banking credits
reached $122.7 billion in 1999 and $209.4 billion in 2000. Consequently,
the ratio of short-temi debt rose abruptly in 2000. Yet, the authors of the
Letter of Intent had envisaged that possible increases in Central Bank
reserves would be able to match the increase in outstanding short-term
foreign debt, and that Turkey would be able to remain sound externally.
However, during the course of the year the banking sector succeeded in
increasing the net inflows of foreign credit by $4.7 billion. During this
process, total short-term debt stock of the banking sector increased to
$16.9 billion from its level of $13.2 billion. The lure ofthe uncontrolled
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flows of speculative gains clearly grew unchecked throughout 2000,
during which the currency risk was eliminated and the entire liquidity
generation mechanism was based on the short-term hot money inflows.
As a quantitative indicator of the short-term speculative capital flows,
we further report on the behavior of the residents' and non-residents'
portfolio purchases and sales of securities, both domestically and abroad.
Data on the residents' sales of securities {inflow of foreign exchange) and
purchases of sectirities (outflows) is depicted in Figure 2a. Figure 2b sets
out the security purchases (inflows) and sales (outflows) of non-residents.
All data are monthly series in millions of dollars and are derived from the
Turkish Republic Central Bank's balance of payments statistics.^
The volatility of the flows and the disruptive spikes of outflows due to
non-residents' operations during November 2000 and February 2001 are
clearly visible in Figure 2b. According to Boratav and Yeldan's
calculations, before the November 2000 crisis non-residents brought a
total of $15.2 billion of "hot money" into the Turkish asset markets, while
the residents enabled an outflow of $5.3 billion.' Thus, during the course
of the program, much of this accumulated short-term debt seems to have
fmanced the flight of residents' capital.
A related indicator of structural fragility present in the system pertains
to the degree of dollarization. Measured as the ratio of foreign exchange
deposits to total deposits of residents, this ratio—which was as high as 55
percent in 1995—stood at 45 percent just before the inception of the
program. The ongoing currency substitution, then, had severely limited the
capability of the monetary authority to control the domestic liquidity.
FIGURE 2a
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS: SECURITIES SALES IINFLOWS) AND PURCHASES
(OUTFLOWS) BY RESIDENTS ABROAD (MILLIONS US$)
;_JOO -
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FIGURE 2b
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS: SECURITIES PURCHASES (INFLOWS) AND SALES
(OUTFLOWS) BY NON-RESIDENTS IN TURKEY (MILLIONS US$)
INFLOWS (Ndn.Rcmlmta' pmcbua of BKUitao ir Turiiey) — • — OUTFLOWS (Non.Raufcnls' <•!« of secimnM in Tinkey)
Source: Based on data from the Central Bank, available at <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr>.
Thus, ignoring these historical attributes and structural characteristics
of the banking system, the orthodox policy of fully connecting the
monetary expansion and liquidity requirements of the domestic economy
exclusively to the speculative short-term capita! flows was clearly a design
flaw—an oversight by the IMF, despite their technical expertise,
DEEPENING THE VULNERABILITY OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
As argued in the preceding section, the underlying cause of the Turkish
currency crisis cannot be attributed to the failure of the fiscal and/or
monetary authorities in maintaining the main targets of the monetary
program. Throughout the year, exchange rate devaluation followed the
programmed schedule and the Central Bank successfully controlled the
expansion of the monetary base by constraining its net domestic asset
position within the program limits.
Similarly, the fiscal operations were in line with both the revenue and
the expenditure targets, and the non-interest primary balance on the
consolidated budget succeeded in attaining the end-of-year target by as
early as September. Consolidated budget data tabulated from the
Undersecretariat of Treasury and the Ministry of Finance reveal that
budget revenue realizations were actually higher than the targeted values
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by 3.6 percent in 2000 and by 5.1 percent in 2001. On the other hand,
expenditure remained 0.2 percent lower than the 2000 target, and the 2001
targets were exceeded by only 1.7 percent. Consequently, during the years
in question public management expenditure and revenue targets were
achieved and the primary (budget) surplus as a ratio to national income
(including privatization and other non-fiscal revenues) increased to 6.1
percent in 2000 and to 6.7 percent in 2001. This "success" in the public
sector balances was attained by restricting expenditure on public services
through the extraordinary forced shrinkage of public investments, and by
way of extraordinary taxation possibilities particular to 2000."
Clearly, the fiscal austerity objectives reached were far below the
program's target. Crisis conditions emerged in due course, mainly as a
result of the increasing fragility in the financial system. This fragility was
generated by the uncontrolled and excessively volatile capital flows with
an exceedingly speculative component. Under the liberalized capital
account system, capital inflows intrinsically necessitated a higher rate of
return on domestic assets in comparison to the rate of depreciation. This
commitment stimulated further foreign capital inflow, and the domestic
currency continued to appreciate—inviting an even higher level of
speculative capital inflow.*
In the context of the Turkish disinflation episode, debt-financed public
deficit and rapid acceleration of private expenditure escalated inflows of
short-term foreign capital and severely increased the vulnerability of the
shallow banking system. As a result, the ratio of the short-term foreign
debt to the Centra! Bank's intemational reserves rose steadily throughout
the program (see Table I). This ratio is regarded as one of the crucial
indicators of extemal fragility. It could be argued that the value of 60
percent for this ratio is considered a critical threshold from an intemational
speculation point of view.'" It is alarming to note that in the Turkish case
this particular ratio has never fa!!en be!ow the 100 percent mark since the
!ibera!ization of the capita! account in 1989. Thus, for the past 12 years the
Turkish financial system has been operating constant!y in the ''danger
zone," as far as this indicator is concerned. During the implementation of
the disinflation program this ratio rose to ! 12 percent in June 2000 and to
147 percent by ear!y December 2000."
Thus, the imp!emcntation of the program itself increased the fmancial
fragility of the domestic asset market. The combined effect of an easy
deficit financing policy and a liquidity-creating mechanism allowing for
no-sterilization induced many commercial banks to shift their asset
management policies toward bond-financing activities. The share of
govemment debt instruments in total assets rose from 10.3 percent in 1989
(completion of capital account liberalization) to 21.3 percent in 1999, and
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was 19.8 percent in 2000.'- The growing willingness of banks to increase
their bond-financing activities under these conditions increased the
fragility of the financial sector against uncovered interest risk. In addition,
the aggressive security management policy of some commercial banks
raised further doubts conceming their sustainability.
It must be further noted in this context that—since the liberalization of
the capital account in 1989—the asset and liability structures of the
banking system have changed substantially. The liability dollarization ratio
increased from 25 percent to 48 percent by the end of 1999. In the same
period, asset dollarization rose from 26 percent to 38 percent, and the share
of the dollar-denominated deposits rose up to 55 percent.'^
The short-term foreign capital inflow-based deficit financing policy of
the govemment, accompanied by high real rates of interest, incited the
commercial banks to extend their short positions in foreign currency,
overlooking prudential asset-liability management. Figure 3 depicts the
foreign versus domestic (TL) liability and asset structure of the banking
system during the 1990s. The steady rise of the open position of the
banking system afler 1996 is clearly visible. During the implementation of
the program—with the elimination of currency risk—the net short position
of the banking system nearly doubled, deepening the vulnerability of the
banking system against foreign currency risk.'''
FIGURK 3
FOREIGN ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND OPEN POSITIONS OF
THE BANKING SECTOR
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In sum, the program and its liquidity creation mechanism deepened the
vulnerability of the banking system to market risks., which have been
inflicted since the liberalization of capital movements.
THE STRUCTURE OF FISCAL FRAGILITY
AND THE BEHAVIOR OF INTEREST RATES
Given past experience of exchange rate-based stabilization programs, it is
now regarded as an empirical regularity that they initially generate a
demand-based expansion accompanied by rising and usually unsustainable
trade and current deficits and are followed by a phase of contraction—the
magnitude of which depends on the size of the earlier external deficits.
During the course of implementation these programs are often associated
with the build-up of a bubble in the asset markets. Yet, as the fragility ofthe
banking system against market risks rises and doubts about the program's
sustainability are intensified, capital inflows reveal a "sudden stop," heavily
squeezing liquidity and sending domestic rates of interest rocketing. This
sequence is well matched with the traditional transmission mechanism of
exchange rate-based stabilization programs,'- and in particular the
November 2000 and February 2001 crisis episodes in Turkey.
In a financially shallow economy and a fragile banking system, the first
disruptive effect of sudden stop and capital reversal is observed in the
interest rates. This is because the transmission of any monetary
disturbance to the rest of the economy is conducted by interest rates and
exchange rates. Yet, since exchange rate-based disinflation programs are
explicitly designed to cut off any corrective adjustments of the exchange
rates, the full effect ofthe monetary disturbance is bound to take place in
the real interest rates.
In the Turkish context, following a causal relationship serves to
summarize this mechanism; the un-sterilized changes in net foreign assets
of the central bank induced changes in the monetary base; in tum, those
were transmitted to the other real and nominal variables by changes in the
interest rates as exchange rates were nominally anchored; under these
conditions, the effects ofthe speculative capital movements on the interest
rates would be magnified. The program overlooked this causal relationship
and ignored its destructive effects in a fragile banking system.
In fact, the starting conditions of the program openly revealed the
structural fragilities ofthe fiscal accounts and the consequent vulnerability
of the fmancial system against interest rate shocks. The data depicted in
Table 2 indicates the deteriorating fiscal stance of the economy. The
program took over a financially fragile fiscal position of an 11.6 budget
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TABLE 2
FISCAL INDICATORS; TURKEY, 1995-2000
As Ratio (0 the GNP (%)
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Note: Government Debt Instruments (Government Bonds + Treasury Bills), exclusive of
Central Bank Advances and Consolidated Debts.
Sources: SPO. Main Economic Indicators., Undersecreteriat of Treasury, Main Economic
Indicators., passim.
deficit/GNP ratio, with interest costs on domestic debt reaching !3.7
percent of the GNP. In addition to the fiscal deterioration, accrued duty
losses (quasi-fiscal deficits) of the public banks reached 12 percent of the
GNP (more than 50 percent of their total assets) in 2000. These accrued,
but unpaid duty losses created very heavy pressure on the liquidity
requirement and increased the distorting effect on the rate of interest.
Critical indicators on domestic debt management underscored the
sensitivity of fiscal balances to the interest rates: interest payments on
domestic debt claimed a rising portion of tax revenues of the consolidated
budget in the 1990s. In 1999, this ratio stood at 66.4 percent of the tax
revenues. Similarly, the fact that the net new domestic borrowing
constituted half of the existing stock of domestic debt in the 1990s clearly
revealed the Ponzi-character of unsustainable debt management. Interest
payments on domestic debt̂ —as a ratio of net new domestic borrowing—
stood at 87.5 percent in 1999 and reached 137.8 percent in 2000 after the
implementation of the program.
Given these structural conditions, the program should have envisaged
the destructive effects of a possible liquidity squeeze on the interest rates
and on the fiscal balance. Under conditions of such interest risk with a
pacified central bank, having all macro adjustment mechanisms tied to the
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interest rates constituted a clear theoretical oversight. The Central Bank
was deprived of all of its traditional tools of austerity and crisis
management and was left defenseless against possible "speculative
attacks" and sudden stops. Under these conditions, it is no surprise that the
viability of the program would finally suffer when the "uneasy
speculators" shifted focus and decided to reverse their flows, leaving the
incipient country illiquid and dried out.
CONCLUSIONS
The Turkish crisis, which eame in the aftermath of an exchange rate-based
disinflation attempt, followed all the well-documented empirieal
regularities of such programs: a demand-based expansion accompanied by
rising and usually unsustainable trade and current deficits followed by a
phase of contraction—in the form of a liquidity squeeze, skyrocketing
interest rates, and negative growth. The main weakness of the 2000
disinflation program was its exclusive reliance on speculative short-term
capital inflows as the souree of the liquidity generation mechanism.
Overlooking the existing structural indicators of fmancial fragility and
resting the liquidity generation meehanism on speculative in- and out-
flows of short-term foreign capital, the program left the economy
defenseless against speculative runs and a sudden stop.
The failure of the program eannot be completely tied to the inability of
the government to undertake accurate actions. By deepening the
vulnerability of an already shallow and fragile financial system, the
underlying liquidity generation mechanism raised doubts concerning
sustainability of the program itself
In sum. muddled with the short-sighted and speculative herd behavior
of domestic and foreign financial arbiters, the IMF-directed Turkish
disinflation episode spells out all too clearly the dangers of restricting the
monetary policy of an economy to speculative in- and out-flows of short-
term foreign capital, which, by itself, is excessively liquid, excessively
volatile, and its movement subject to herd psychology.
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